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In the fall of 1921, the Viennese social reformer Eugenie Schwarzwald
approached a young Hungarian émigré with a proposition: Mariette Lydis, a
friend of Schwarzwald’s, had created a set of watercolors, and now the two of them
were looking for someone to write a collection of fairy tales to accompany the
images in a book publication. The young author, Béla Balázs, agreed, and he
penned sixteen tales in the space of three weeks. The book was published under
the title Der Mantel der Träume (The cloak of dreams).
A few years later, the Frankfurter Zeitung began running a serialized novel by a
curiously anonymous author: Ginster: Von ihm selbst geschrieben (Gorse: Written by
himself) was the title, and the novel made a splash. By the time it was published in
book form by the prestigious Fischer Verlag in the fall of 1928, however, most
interested readers would have divined the author’s identity: barely concealed
behind the smoke screens of fictionalization, anonymization, pseudonyms, and
newspaper bylines was none other than Siegfried Kracauer, himself an editor and
film critic at the Frankfurter Zeitung. Forced into exile in 1933, Kracauer would go
on to write a second novel, Georg, a sequel of sorts, during his Paris years. This
time, all indications were that he would publish under his own name—but in the
hardships of emigration that ultimately led him to the United States, Kracauer
failed to secure a contract, and the novel was only published posthumously by
Suhrkamp in 1970.
A similar fate befell another exile who, on July 13, 1940, in London, com-
pleted the final page of a typescript entitled Eine verkehrte Welt (A topsy-turvy
world), a novel of the fantastic (ein phantastischer Roman) on which he had been
working during the 1930s in Italy and England. In the turbulent years of war and
emigration, it would take another decade before the young author, now in the
USA, would secure a contract for the novel with the German publisher Curt
* This article was prompted by the first Berkeley Conference on Silent Cinema, held in 2011 and
devoted to “Cinema Across Media.” I am grateful to the organizers of that event for including the ini-
tial version, which I subsequently developed with the help of incisive comments from Dana Polan and
my colleagues Kerstin Barndt, Andreas Gailus, and Julia Hell. I am grateful, as well, to the editors of
October for their useful feedback during the editorial process. Unless indicated otherwise, all transla-
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Weller. As luck would have it, the latter went bankrupt while the book was in pro-
duction; only half a century later would a small publishing house in Cologne pick
up the manuscript again. By the time Eine verkehrte Welt appeared in 1997, its
author—Rudolf Arnheim—was well into his nineties.
***
A beautifully illustrated collection of Orientalist fairy tales; a pseudo-bio-
graphical novel in a mildly satirical mode; and an allegorical piece of science
fiction that holds up an inverted mirror to a Western civilization already in disar-
ray: generically and stylistically, these three texts have little to do with one
another—or so it would appear, if their authors did not form a rather well-defined
trio, whose close relations would have been readily apparent to readers with an
interest in cinema: to film scholars, Béla Balázs, Siegfried Kracauer, and Rudolf
Arnheim remain well known to this day as pioneers of what we now consider “clas-
sical film theory.” Setting out as brilliant young critics of the equally young
medium (each of them a consummate stylist in his own right), they were
acquainted with each other’s influential articles in the leading papers of Vienna,
Frankfurt, and Berlin; and although they began from distinct premises and
arrived at divergent conclusions, they would continue to acknowledge, cite, and
review each other’s work, going on in a more theoretical mode to dilate on cine-
matic technique and style, the medium’s relationship to folk art, its form-giving
powers, and its redemptive realism. 
To be sure, there are important differences between Arnheim’s formalism,
for example, and Kracauer’s realism;1 or between Balázs’s romantic interpreta-
tion of the close-up of a face as a conduit to the soul and Arnheim’s modernist
enthusiasm for the close-up as an alienating perceptual effect. But historical
distance also permits a synoptic view of classical film theory as a relatively uni-
fied affair, one in which our trio is comfortably aligned with respect to shared
goals and assumptions. From such a historicizing perspective, which has been
gaining ground among scholars and critics in recent years,2 at least three com-
1. This distinction is intimated in Kracauer’s own assertion, in the preface to Theory of Film, that
“my book differs from most writings in the field in that it is a material aesthetics, not a formal one.”
Siegfried Kracauer, Theory of Film (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. xlix (emphasis in
original); it was subsequently cemented in Dudley Andrew’s influential The Major Film Theories (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1976). The realism/formalism divide has served since then as the structuring
template for virtually all subsequent accounts of classical film theory, with the notable exception of
Malcolm Turvey’s recent critique in Doubting Vision: Film and the Revelationist Tradition (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008).
2. Eric Rentschler points out that already in 1981, Karsten Witte had “described Arnheim, Balázs,
and Kracauer as the ‘ABKs’ of German film theory, a formulation that suggests we might productively
consider them as a collective corpus rather than as embodiments of altogether different perspectives.”
“Rudolf Arnheim’s Early Passage Between Social and Aesthetic Film Criticism,” in Arnheim for Film and
Media Studies, Scott Higgins, ed. (New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 62. To the example of the three
authors with which this article is concerned, we should add that of André Bazin. Recent scholarly activ-
monalities emerge: first, these three thinkers jointly aspired, along with a host
of other classical film theorists, to vindicate cinema as an art form on par with
the other arts (consider the title of Arnheim’s seminal Film as Art). Second,
above and beyond their distinct affinities with “modernism” or “formalism” on
the one hand and “realism” on the other, they shared an investment in what
Malcolm Turvey has usefully described as the “revelationist” strain of classical
film theory: each of these theorists was drawn to the new medium for its ability
to overcome the perceived shortcomings of human vision—in Kracauer’s
words, to “reveal things normally unseen.”3 Third, given their background in
the humanistic canon of European letters, they shared a number of premises
drawn from classical aesthetics. In particular, as Noël Carroll has demonstrated
by subjecting important texts by the classical film theorists to analytical cri-
t ique, v irtually all of classical film theor y espoused what he calls the
“medium-specificity thesis.” According to this thesis, which dates back to
Lessing’s Laocoön treatise, “each art form, in virtue of its medium, has its own
exclusive domain of development.”4 Carroll has argued persuasively that this
line of thinking regularly accompanies the rise of new media such as film, pho-
tography, and video, whose status as art it ostensibly helps to legitimize—in
other words, the shared espousal of the medium-specificity thesis relates
directly to the shared impulse to legitimize film as art. 
Carroll has serious misgivings about the validity of this thesis on analytic-philo-
sophical grounds, calling it fallacious to either construe a medium’s limitations and
possibilities as normative for that medium or assert the existence of a causal connec-
tion between style and ontology. This argument has clear merit and is worth
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ities in this area include the fact that Béla Balázs’s major works, as well as his fairy tales, are now avail-
able for the first time in English translation, and conferences at Harvard, Yale, Paris, and Dartmouth
have led to anthologies taking up “Arnheim for film and media studies,” “opening Bazin” for reconsid-
eration, and probing Kracauer’s legacies. See Béla Balázs, Early Film Theory: Visible Man and The Spirit
of Film, ed. Erica Carter, trans. Rodney Livingstone (New York: Berghahn, 2010); Béla Balázs, The Cloak
of Dreams: Chinese Fairy tales, trans. Jack Zipes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Arnheim for
Film and Media Studies, ed. Scott Higgins (New York: Routledge, 2010); Opening Bazin: Postwar Film
Theory and Its Afterlife, ed. Dudley Andrew with Hervé Joubert Laurencin (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011); Culture in the Anteroom: The Legacies of Siegfried Kracauer, ed. Gerd Gemünden and Johannes
von Moltke (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012); as well as an edition of Siegfried Kracauer’s
American Writings: Essays on Film and Popular Culture, ed. Johannes von Moltke and Kristy Rawson
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012).
3. Kracauer, Theory of Film, p. 46. On the “revelationist tradition” in classical film theory, see
Turvey, Doubting Vision. Turvey occasionally appears to exclude the “modernist” Arnheim from this tra-
dition, but as he himself rightly points out, the “revelationist” interest in the cinema tends to subsume
the modernist/realist dialectic. Turvey further differentiates his arguments in “Arnheim and
Modernism,” in Arnheim for Film and Media Studies, pp. 31–49.
4. Noël Carroll, “The Specificity of Media in the Arts,” in Theorizing the Moving Image (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 25. See also “Medium Specificity Arguments and the Self-
Consciously Invented Arts: Film, Video, and Photography,” in the same volume, pp. 3–24. Kracauer, for
example, formulates the medium-specificity thesis at the outset of his Theory of Film: “This study rests
upon the assumption that each medium has a specific nature which invites certain kinds of communi-
cations while obstructing others,” p. 3.
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debating on its own terms,5 but there is also a sense in which Carroll’s trenchant log-
ical critique misses the point, imposing standards of academic rigor and logical
coherence that are at odds with the rather more broadly defined forms of humanis-
tic inquiry that these thinkers pursued during the silent era and beyond.6 Here, the
classical theorists’ turn to literary fiction becomes significant—not for being any less
rigorous than their critical writings, but for bringing that rigor to bear on the (liter-
ary) imagination rather than on (formal) logic, and, perhaps even more important,
for pursuing questions of cinematic specificity in the medium of literature.7 A re-
reading of the above-mentioned texts, in other words, gives rise to a lingering
suspicion concerning Carroll’s argument: if these thinkers were indeed wedded to
the notion of medium specificity, how do we account for what we might call their
media promiscuity, which combined a love for the cinema with attentive criticism and
a theoretical defense of the medium, as well as with an urge to try their hands at var-
ious literary genres?8 (This is not even to mention Balázs’s forays into opera, or
Arnheim’s later turn to art history.) As I will show, there is a substantive give-and-
take between these theorists’ fairy tales and novels, on the one hand, and the theo-
ries they construed, on the other. This prose work, in other words, went hand in
hand with the elaboration of the central positions in classical film theory, which the
novels help in turn to elucidate. 
A closer look at these texts quickly reveals their cinematic qualit ies.
Expressionist cinema’s nightmare scenarios, silent melodramas’ pathos, and espe-
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5. In a penetrating analysis of André Bazin’s theories of cinematic realism, Daniel Morgan has
offered a rejoinder to Carroll, arguing that the medium-specificity thesis may be construed in terms other
than the direct, causal link between the “nature” or essence of film and its attendant stylistic options
(whether realist or modernist). Following Michael Fried, Morgan proposes that, rather than dispense
with the ontological or essentialist arguments of the classical film theorists, we think of style as a way of
acknowledging—even if by negation—the specificity of a given medium’s constitution. Rather than fol-
lowing necessarily from the photographic nature of cinema, realism as discussed by Bazin or Kracauer
should be understood, according to Morgan, as one of various ways to acknowledge the ontology of the
photographic image at the level of style. Daniel Morgan, “Rethinking Bazin: Ontology and Realist
Aesthetics,” Critical Inquiry 32 (Spring 2006), pp. 443–81. For a differently situated argument for recon-
sidering classical film theory’s notions of medium specificity, see Mary Ann Doane, “The Indexical and
the Concept of Medium Specificity,” Differences 18, no. 1 (2007), pp. 128–52. 
6. “By philosophical standards,” Miriam Hansen concedes, “Kracauer’s mode of analysis sometimes
appears slippery and inconsistent, if not contradictory.” But unlike Carroll, Hansen proceeds to
inquire into the payoff, rather than only into the logical flaws, of the kinds of figurative, rhetorical, and
stylistic devices that Kracauer deploys: “What ensures continued fascination with Kracauer’s texts is
that they are suffused with another kind of logic, a style of theorizing that we might call writerly or
poetic. Kracauer argues as much through images and tropes, through figures of chiasmus, paradox,
understatement and literalization, as through analytic reasoning and allegorical abstraction.” Miriam
Hansen, Cinema and Experience: Siegfried Kracauer, Walter Benjamin, and Theodor W. Adorno (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2011), p. 5.
7. It is worth recalling, moreover, that all three authors wrote literary criticism as well, and that
Balázs had been the head of the literary department of the governing council in Béla Kun’s short-lived
Soviet Republic in Hungary in 1919. Cf. Loewy, Béla Balázs.
8. Of course, this includes attention to other media. Drawing on Arnheim’s numerous writings on
the subject of television from 1930 onwards, Doron Galili has persuasively argued that even “this key
thinker, who is best known for his commitment to concepts of medium specificity and interest in
aspects that distinguish media from one another, was also attentive to questions of intermedial rela-
tionships.” Doron Galili, “Television from Afar: Arnheim’s Understanding of Media,” in Arnheim for
Film and Media Studies, p. 196.
cially America’s much-admired slapstick find their ways into the thematic and for-
mal construction of these novels. Similarly, one might consider how “filmic writing”
suffuses a novel like Ginster just as much as it does texts by other writers of the time,
from Alfred Döblin to Irmgard Keun, from Anna Seghers to Dos Passos. Conversely,
the literary output of Balázs, Arnheim, and Kracauer certainly invites us to recon-
sider the narrative and stylistic construction of their more properly theoretical
texts; though my focus in the present essay lies elsewhere, I do mean my title to
imply what I regard as the centrality of figurative, rhetorical, and other literary
devices in the formulation of classical film theory. There is still much to be learned
about the latter by analyzing, say, the “literariness” of Kracauer’s film reviews from
the 1920s or the hyperbole of Balázs paean to the new medium, its rhetorical con-
struction of his own readership as a collective blessed with new powers of vision.9
But what emerges even more importantly from a reading of these novels and
fairy tales are their properly film-theoretical dimensions. In keeping with Miriam
Hansen’s reminder, apropos of Kracauer, that “it would be shortsighted to restrict
an account of [his] early film theory to writings that explicitly and exclusively deal
with film,”10 I turn to these literary writings for the contribution they make to our
understanding of Kracauer’s, Balázs’s, and Arnheim’s canonical works on film. By
reading the fictional prose alongside cinema and its theorization, then, I propose
neither to retrace the “debates on cinema” among the literati of the 1920s11 nor
to revisit the place of cinema and literature in the “discourse networks” of the
time,12 let alone to offer yet another elaboration of the overworked concept of
“adaptation.” If anything, I wish to reverse the thrust of the latter and investigate
the construction of the novel in the spirit of classical film theory. My goal, then, is
not to analyze these texts as exemplars of “filmic writing” in the age of silent cin-
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9. On the literary qualities of Kracauer’s early criticism, see Inka Mülder, Siegfried Kracauer,
Grenzgänger zwischen Theorie und Literatur: Seine frühen Schriften 1903–1933 (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1985); on
Balázs and spectatorship, see Sabine Hake, “Film, Folk, Class: Béla Balázs on Spectatorship,” in Film—
Kino—Zuschauer: Filmrezeption/Film—Cinema—Spectator: Film Reception, ed. Irmbert Schenk, Margrit
Tröhler, and Yvonne Zimmerman (Marburg: Schüren, 2010), pp. 159–71.
10. Miriam Hansen, Cinema and Experience, p. 3. Though the literary production of these three authors
has until now not been considered jointly, and while Arnheim’s novel has gone essentially unnoticed to
date, I am not the first to draw attention to the give-and-take between Balázs’s and Kracauer’s literary
texts and their elaborations on film. On Balázs, see in particular Hanno Loewy, “Space, Time, and ‘Rites
de Passage’: Béla Balázs’s Paths to Film,” October 115 (Winter 2006), pp. 61–76, as well as Loewy’s biogra-
phy, Béla Balázs: Märchen, Ritual und Film (Berlin: Vorwerk 8, 2003); and Erica Carter, “Introduction,” in
Béla Balázs, Early Film Theory, pp. xv–xlvi. On Kracauer, see Mülder-Bach, Siegfried Kracauer; Christian
Rogowski, “‘Written By Himself’: Siegfried Kracauer’s Auto-Biographical Novels,” in Culture in the
Anteroom, pp. 199–212; Jörg Lau, “‘Ginsterismus.’ Komik und Ichlosigkeit. Über filmische Komik in
Siegfried Kracauers erstem Roman Ginster,” in Siegfried Kracauer: Zum Werk des Romanciers, Feuilletonisten,
Architekten, Filmwissenschaftlers und Soziologen, ed. Andreas Volk (Zürich: Seismo, 1996), pp. 13–42.
11. See, for instance, the texts assembled in Anton Kaes, Kino-Debatte. Texte zum Verhältnis von
Literatur und Film 1909–1929 (Munich: dtv, 1978).
12. See, most recently, Stefanie Harris, Mediating Modernity: German Literature and the “New” Media,
1895–1930 (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2009), as well as Francesco Casetti,
“Adaptations and Mis-adaptations: Film, Literature, and Social Discourses,” in A Companion to Literature
and Film, ed. Robert Stam and Alessandra Raengo (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), pp. 81–91.
ema (the way Eisenstein, for example, reads Dickens)13 but to trace in them some
of the central film-theoretical motifs elaborated by these and other authors at the
time—among them the emphasis on perception and spectatorship, cinematogra-
phy and montage, and the increasing visuality of culture. 
Underpinning these motifs, I will suggest, is a common assessment of cinema
as a quintessentially modern medium that registers and contributes to shifting
constructions of subjectivity. The literary texts under consideration flesh out the
contours of such a modern subject, and we might profitably read this as a contri-
bution to film theory. But these texts also yield a further perspective on the
theories with which they are indissolubly linked. Far from merely illustrating their
authors’ theoretical preoccupations in another mode or medium, they draw
attention to a fundamental fact all too often overlooked in the discussion of film
theory and its histories: the degree to which the elaboration of the “classical” the-
ories of film was a project forged in exile and colored by the theorists’ exilic
experiences. Buried in books such as Visible Man, The Spirit of Film, Theory of Film,
and the editorial history Film as Art,14 the dimension of exile becomes explicit in
texts such as The Coat of Dreams and Eine verkehrte Welt and is present metaphori-
cally in Ginster. These authors’ literary imaginations, I hope to show, circle around
questions of exile and attendant fantasies if not of repatriation then of reparation
or repair—fantasies, I will argue, that inform their theoretical projects at some
fundamental level as well.
To recover this dimension, we need only recall the circumstances under
which our three authors composed their literary works. When the young Balázs
accepted Schwarzwald’s commission for Der Mantel der Träume in Vienna, he had
only recently parted ways with his erstwhile friend and collaborator György
Lukács and fled the failed Hungarian revolution; what followed was a long
period of exile in Berlin (where he wrote his two major volumes on film) and
the Soviet Union. The title tale of Balázs’s collection, to which I turn in detail
below, provides only one instance among several in which forms of exile enter
into fairy-tale plots.15 Arnheim’s novel was similarly written in forced exile in
Italy and the U.K., and it is here that the motif of exile as the novel’s “topsy-
turvy world” becomes most explicit: from the moment he crosses a border by
train in the opening scene, the protagonist is utterly displaced—and although
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13. Cf. Sergei Eisenstein, “Dickens, Griffith, and the Film Today,” in Film Form: Essays in Film Theory,
ed. and trans. Jay Leyda (New York: Harcourt, 1949), pp. 195–256.
14. Film als Kunst (Berlin: Rowohlt) was published in 1932 one year before Arnheim’s forced flight
into exile; it would be wrong, therefore, to claim that the book is tinged with any history of exile. The vol-
ume’s widespread influence, however, can arguably be traced more to the abridged English edition of
1955 than to the German original. On the degree to which the truncated Film as Art represents not only a
shortened but an abstracted, hyper-formalist version of an argument whose roots in daily, lived, and social
experience have been severed in translation, see Eric Rentschler, “Rudolf Arnheim’s Early Passage.”
15. Other fairy tales that spin out the motifs of exile, longing, and displacement include “Die
Sonnenschirme,” about a couple’s attempt to find peace under magical parasols that all seem to con-
spire against a stable sense of home, and “Die Freunde,” in which the prolonged separation of two
friends results in a rupture that can only be mended in the afterlife.
the novel never explicitly discounts the possibility that he may be traveling as a
tourist, it seems equally significant that the possibility of a return home is never
broached. Finally, Kracauer would be forced to emigrate, like Arnheim, by the
Nazi’s seizure of power and would write his second novel, Georg, during his
French exile. To be sure, he completed Ginster while still in Germany, where he
was working at the hub of cultural life at the Frankfurter Zeitung. But, as numer-
ous commentators have noted, the motif of homelessness—or, as Kracauer
himself would put it, extraterritoriality—predates the forced departure from his
home country.16 It is significant that in the original version of the novel, the
semi-autobiographical figure of Ginster, who, as we shall see, never fits in and
always wants to “trickle away,” ends up stranded in Marseille. Kracauer would go
on to reflect explicitly on this tangential, exilic disposition, raising it to a privi-
leged epistemological vantage point in his final work on historiography.17
Homelessness, then, was to these authors both a transcendental notion and
a lived reality that profoundly marked their writings. While this positioning is less
apparent, at first glance, in the film theory for which they became known, I pro-
pose that we conceive of their less frequently read literary prose as, among other
things, middle texts between authorial biography and cinema theory—fiction that
mediates between lived experience (of exile, of cinema) and the attempt to pro-
vide a generalizing, theoretical account of that experience. A reading of these
film theorists’ novels, with their displaced characters who express homesickness
and longing, however romantically inflected, in disturbingly upside-down worlds,
should prompt us to reread the seminal texts of classical film theory for how they
position the new medium and how much of classical film theory is informed by,
and produced from, exilic experience.
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16. “Kracauer’s exile did not begin in 1933, and his later plea for a personal ‘extraterritoriality’
merely made explicit a persistent motif in his writings from the beginning.” Miriam Hansen, Cinema
and Experience, p. 286 n. 24. Reading an important essay published soon after Kracauer’s arrival in New
York, Inka Mülder-Bach similarly argues that this arrival “marks a position that Kracauer had outlined
since the 1920s and which informs his early writing both as a concept and a textual perspective.” “The
Exile of Modernity: Siegfried Kracauer’s Figurations of the Stranger,” in Culture in the Anteroom, p. 280.
Kracauer himself confessed to “a long-held, deep-seated need to live exterritorially” in a 1963 letter to
Theodor Adorno, and he organized parts of his correspondence with the latter in a folder labeled
“Exterritorialität.” See Theodor W. Adorno and Siegfried Kracauer, Der Riß der Welt geht auch durch mich:
Briefwechsel 1923–1966, ed. Wolfgang Schopf (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2008), p. 621. For further elabora-
t ions of the mot if of extraterr itor ialit y in Kracauer, see, among others, Mart in Jay, “The
Extraterritorial Life of Siegfried Kracauer,” in Permanent Exiles (New York: Columbia University Press,
1986), pp. 152–97; Enzo Traverso, Siegfried Kracauer: Itineraire d’un intellectual nomade (Paris: Editions La
Découverte, 1994).
17. Kracauer’s History works through several figures of the historian, among them Ahasverus, the
Wandering Jew; Orpheus; and the Exile. These figurations serve to shore up Kracauer’s overall claim
that historical knowledge is best constructed in “the near-vacuum of extra-territoriality”: only in a
“state of self-effacement, or homelessness,” Kracauer asserts, can the scholar fully grasp the object of
study. Kracauer, History: The Last Things Before the Last (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 84.
Dreams, Inversions, Disappearing Tricks: Fables of Extraterritoriality
The image that inspires the title of Balázs’s book and its eponymous fairy
tale is an ornate rendering of a royal couple. The watercolor is dominated by the
king, who covers the center and foreground of the image to the point of dwarfing
not only the houses and spires in the (presumably distant) background, but also
the queen just behind him. And yet, questions of perspective and relative size
recede in importance in relation to the watercolor’s emphasis on surface and
ornament: here, too, the king takes center stage with his elaborately designed
cloak—but rather than standing out in front of the background, he becomes part
of a planar composition; the contour line hardly contains his massive body, which
seems to blend with the similar colors and ornamental echoes of the buildings in
the background.
Little wonder, then, that Balázs seized on the motif of the cloak as a surface,
a canvas on which the empress stitches the images of her dreams. The accompany-
ing “Oriental” fairy tale, “Der Mantel der Träume,” tells the story of Emperor
Ming-Huang and his wife, Nai-Fe.18 Their love, we learn, is “damaged” because
Nai-Fe, who died too early in a previous life, has a “dreaming soul”: even when the
emperor holds her in his arms, her soul drifts away in reverie. One night, she
divines the solution to this problem of too distant (or too distracted) love: in her
sleep, she sees her husband 
wearing a marvelous cloak on which all the images of her dreams
had been embroidered. . . . His cloak carried the entire dreamland
for which her soul yearned. Nai-Fe’s heart was delighted and filled
with happiness, for now she could keep her gaze upon the emperor
and hold it forever. No longer did she have to choose between the
path of her dreams and the path of her love.19
As in many other fairy tales by Balázs, the emperor and his wife long for a utopian
form of love or friendship that overcomes the separation of self and other, a com-
plete—if mystical—union.20 As Hanno Loewy notes, Balázs translated his own
sense of alienation into a “tireless search for a medium that would create unities
between artist and reader, desire and form, object and subject, a search that led
him to wallow in romantic irrationalism and to experiment with the widest variety
of mediums and genres”—a search that during Balázs’s early years would lead him
to cultivate the fairy tale in particular as a medium of mystic union.21 What sets
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18. On the pervasiveness of Orientalism at the time when Balázs was writing, see the review of the
recent English translation of Der Mantel der Träume by Eliot Weinberger, “The Man Who Wrote
Everything,” New York Review of Books, Nov. 25, 2010, pp. 52–53.
19. Béla Balázs, The Cloak of Dreams, p. 66.
20. See especially the tales “Die Opium-Raucher” and “Die Freunde” in Der Mantel der Träume.
21. Hanno Loewy, “Space, Time.” As Zipes puts it, Balázs used the fairy tale “as a genre to pursue
his mystical notion of identity and to celebrate his oneness with the world in opposition to the forces
of alienation.” Jack Zipes, “Béla Balázs, the Homeless Wanderer, or, The Man Who Sought to Become
One with the World,” in Balázs, The Cloak of Dreams, p. 11.
Watercolor from Der Mantel der Träume:
Chinesische Novellen von Béla Balázs mit 20
Bildern von Mariette Lydis. 1922.
the title tale apart from Balázs’s other stories for our purposes is the central
device of the cloak as a material—if magical—support for that oneness or union.
Having spent five years embroidering it with her innermost images, Nai-Fe brings
the coat to the emperor and is “filled with joy and happiness” at the sight of her
husband “wrapped in her dreams” (in ihre Träume gehüllt, 68). The cloak, we might
say, functions as a screen on which Nai-Fe both projects and beholds her dream
images. In other words, it is a visual medium that promises immediacy and the
fusion of the spectator with the image—a dispositif that will resonate strongly in
the history of film theory, where we find critics such as Jean Baudry and Christian
Metz developing notions of the screen, the spectator, and the fusion of percep-
tion and representation along similar lines.22
In the tale of Ming-Huang and Nai-Fe, this projection comes at a price. As
the lovers realize once the emperor tries on the magical cloak, its dream images
create a distance that cannot be bridged physically: when Nai-Fe attempts to
approach her husband, “the entire, spacious dreamland lay between her and the
emperor, and she couldn’t come to him” (68). Again, the two are confronted with
a stark choice between empty, physical proximity and fulfilled, dreamy distance.
Nai-Fe tells the emperor, 
If you take off the cloak, you can hold me in your arms, but my soul
will be far away from you. If you wear the cloak, I won’t be able to
approach you, and I won’t be able to come to you. But the longing
of my soul will eternally cast its glances upon you (69).
Forsaking physical presence, the emperor chooses the cloak—which is to say: an
image-based medium of the soul. In this, as other commentators have also
observed, the fairy-tale character anticipates rather strikingly the contemporane-
ous turn of it s author, Béla Balázs, from literature to film, as well as his
theorization of the cinema as a new folk art and the medium of the soul.23 Balázs’s
subsequent book, Der sichtbare Mensch (Visible man), of 1924, is suffused with the
same Romantic motifs that he was working out in fairy-tale form in 1921—motifs
that include the expressivity of a visual medium and its constitutive link to what
Balázs (like the early Lukács) calls the “soul”; the fusion of self and other in the
act of spectatorship; and the medium’s power to convey the “physiognomy” of
things. Like the cloak of dreams, cinema is for Balázs a medium that lends expres-
sion to the soul, “the visual corollary of human souls immediately made flesh.”24
What materializes on the coat as “all the images of [Nai-Fe’s] dreams” is precisely
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22. See Christian Metz, The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and the Cinema (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1986); Jean-Louis Baudry, “The Apparatus: Metapsychological Approaches to the
Impression of Reality in the Cinema,” in Film Theory and Criticism: Introductory Readings, ed. Leo Braudy
and Marshall Cohen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 760–77.
23. Loewy suggests that “The Cloak of Dreams” reads “like a poetic illustration of Balázs’ theory of
the cinema.” Loewy, “Space, Time,” p. 66. See also Loewy, Béla Balázs, and Hake, “Film, Folk, Class.”
24. Balázs, Early Film Theory, p. 11. 
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Carter’s excellent discussion, where she shows that “the fairy-tale prefigures . . . many features of the
close-up’s organization of time.” Carter, “Introduction,” pp. xxviii–xxxii.
27. Balázs, Early Film Theory, p. 46. 
28. Balázs, Early Film Theory, p. 49.
29. Hake, p. 168.
30. Loewy, “Space, Time,” p. 61.
what Balázs will later theorize as the expressive movement of the soul, the
Ausdrucksbewegung (expressive movement) as it becomes manifest on the cinema
screen through devices such as the close-up.25 As if echoing the constellation of
his earlier fairy tale, Balázs now defines the close-up in cinema, “film’s true ter-
rain,” as a naturalist device but imbues it with a tenderness that prompts him to
speak of a “naturalism of love.”26 At the same time, he places the medium of cin-
ema under the aegis of expressionism for its revelationist physiognomies, its
ostensibly unique ability to “represent [the] ‘face of things.’”27 Zeroing in on the
links between expressionism, dream, and vision that would have been apparent to
anyone writing on film in the early 1920s, he reprises the direct address with
which Der sichtbare Mensch occasionally interpellates its readers; but he also reprises
the central motif of “The Cloak of Dreams,” in which a landscape, embroidered
on a screen-like cloak, is but an extension of Nai-Fe’s soul—her physiognomy, as
Balázs would call it:
Have you never had this curious dream experience? You are out walk-
ing in a landscape and recognize in it the face of one of your friends or
enemies. It is nothing more or less than a landscape. But it contains an
obvious physiognomy that betrays it. . . . The capacity to illuminate the
secret affinity between the dreamer’s physiognomy and that of his
dream is one of the most wonderful miracles of film art.28
If “The Cloak of Dreams” is indeed an allegory of cinema, as Sabine Hake has sug-
gested,29 then what it allegorizes is not simply the historical rise of the medium or
its shifting styles but also the “spirit of film” as theorized by Balázs himself—its
physiognomic qualities as a new folk art and heir apparent to the oral tradition of
the fairy tale.
“All of his life,” writes Loewy, Balázs “wished to remain a writer. He never got
over the fact that his writing was lost in the shadow—or better the light—of film.”30
Perhaps, by reading his film theory as a continuation of his fictional work, we might
rehabilitate the latter—both for its intrinsic merits, which have recently been recog-
nized by a new German edition and a translation into English, and as a contribution
to a history of classical film theory. To be sure, the cinema produces fairy tales or fan-
tastic genres, films that offer visual equivalents for Balázs’s literary themes of mystical
union, utopian love, and inner visions of the soul—after all, these are hallmarks of
the expressionist cinema that was flourishing at precisely the moment of Balázs’s turn
to cinema. But my point here is that the fairy tale reads not like the blueprint for a
film script but as an elaboration of film theory in a fictional mode. By the same
token, Balázs’s film theory continues to elaborate the insights he gathers from his
preoccupation with fairy tales. For all its insistence on medium specificity,31 Der sicht-
bare Mensch becomes legible as a trans-medial aesthetics of expressivity that subsumes
fairy tales and the cinema as two equally valid avenues for the manifestation of the
soul. If anything, the literary texts make more explicit the motif of longing that
underpins so much of Balázs’s writing, whether in literature or on film: a Romantic
motif that the fairy tales render legible as a response to alienation and displacement.
The fantasy that animates these tales, in other words, is that of a magical/utopian
world in which identification and desire are mutually enabling and where the latter’s
realization does not exact the price of separation, as in the unbridgeable distance
that keeps Nai-Fe and the emperor apart. It is the fantasy of a “society of love,” as the
young Lukács still called it, a fantasy tested and debated in the famous “Sunday
Circle” that both Lukács and Balázs frequented during their Budapest years. Without
denying the Central European, cosmopolitan dimensions of this fantasy, which Erica
Carter has pointed out, it is perhaps worth recalling that The Cloak of Dreams formu-
lates the tale at a remove from the Sunday Circle and the memories of Budapest,
placing it at the beginning of an exilic trajectory that will wind up, somewhat bitterly,
in Moscow.
***
Even more explicitly than Balázs’s fairy tales, Rudolf Arnheim’s Eine verkehrte
Welt functions on the level of fantasy, as is evident from its generic inscription as a
phantastischer Roman. But the latter operates on a completely different aesthetic
principle: where Balázs yearns for a re-enchanted world in which meaning and
expression and dream world and material world (or what Lukács called “the soul
and the forms”) are coextensive, Arnheim concocts a strict logical inversion of our
world, where binary distinctions are not suspended but verkehrt, or turned upside
down, as the title readily suggests. So clear is this procedure, in fact, that it also
indexes the underlying wish for a situation in which such inversions might be
righted again and the displaced subject of the novel regain his bearings.
The story begins as the nameless first-person narrator is crossing a border by
train. He carries with him a notebook for the purpose of “writing down what I expe-
rience in your country,” as he tells the customs officer (8). The experiences that he
proceeds to relate over the course of the novel map out a strange world indeed: its
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inhabitants sleep during the daytime and go about their business at night; instead of
wearing clothes, they hide only their naked faces behind masks. Food, a privilege of
the working poor, is distributed as a form of entertainment rather than responding
to a basic biological need; dirt is a virtue, and cleanliness shameful. In this country,
clocks run according to the whim of their owners rather than following a pre-given
rhythm of seconds, minutes, and hours; public transportation is designed to run
slowly, unreliably, and with as many accidents as possible rather than serving the
needs of travelers. Social hierarchies, too, are reversed: women rule, children com-
mand adults, work is a privilege reserved for the upper classes, and the poor lord it
over the downtrodden rich who occasionally take to the streets for their rights (as
described in a chapter entitled Reichendemonstration, or “march of the rich”). Several
chapters detail the working of such public institutions as schools, the newspaper,
and the decidedly Kafkaesque “patience office” (Geduldamt)—a blend of police sta-
tion and hospital which you enter healthy and leave sick. One chapter, finally, is
devoted to a strange blend of cinema and television called Erziehungskino (education
cinema): here, the audience assembles to watch moving images projected on a
screen, but these turn out to be live transmissions. In an inversion of television
broadcasting, the images here are somehow transmitted not to the home but from
cameras hidden in a regular family’s apartment. Where the narrator expects to see a
fictional film, he is confronted with filmed reality. Nonetheless, he is impressed by
the powerful performances of the family members—even after he has been told
that they are not actors. His companion, the mask-maker’s daughter, explains the
aesthetic effect of second-order reality: “It’s in our nature that we only have eyes to
see what every day brings when things are represented to us in images and we con-
template them from our seats” (144).
Of course, this moment of aesthetic contemplation and revelationist vision in
the Erziehungskino is also a mise-en-abyme, a moment in which the novel mirrors
itself in the object it represents: like the strange events that unfold in the movie
theater, the plot of Eine verkehrte Welt is designed to “open our eyes” to the construc-
t ion of everyday reality; the upside-down world allegorizes our ostensibly
right-side-up existence, and the narrator functions as an ethnographer whose gaze
at the foreign environment has the power of estranging our own notions of self
and society. The result is profoundly unsettling—for the reader as well as the narra-
tor, who wonders whether he is gradually becoming used to the absurdities of his
new world and no longer perceives them as such, or whether he is now seeing him-
self for who he really is. “With increasing frequency,” he notes, “I appeared strange
to myself, foreign, laughable, even inappropriate in one thing or another” (111).
It is no coincidence that the cinema (coupled with the nascent technology
of television)32 plays a central role in this alienation effect, not because of the par-
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ema and radio had to compete, or find a way to coexist, with broadcast television. As early as 1930, he
was anticipating, “within measurable time,” the advent of “films . . . broadcast from a central projecting
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ticular contents of the stories it tells—be it the science fiction of Eine verkehrte Welt
or the live reality of the Erziehungskino—but because of the distance it places
between reality and representation and the aesthetic effect that results. After all,
this is how Arnheim himself had theorized “film as art” a few years prior to leaving
Germany and embarking on what would remain his only attempt at fiction. As is
well known, the premise of Film als Kunst (Film as art), from 1932, was that, like
other media, film could but did not necessarily have to be used to create art. To
argue the artistic value of film, then, Arnheim proceeded to outline a series of
fundamental distinctions between what he called Weltbild, the image of the world,
and Filmbild, the image of silent cinema.33 The latter is determined by various fac-
tors: framed film images do not allow for peripheral vision and translate the
colors of the world into a gray scale; stereoscopic vision is replaced by the monoc-
ular perspective of the camera, reducing the possibilities for depth perception;
and for the spectator fixed in his/her seat, the senses of cinema—sight and
sound—are isolated from the other senses, which offer no input to accompany the
visual perception of, say, a roller coaster amplified by a drum roll from the orches-
tra pit. Film, according to Arnheim, is art to the degree that it emphasizes these
distinctions and uses them as aesthetic devices.
None of this will be news to the reader of classical film theory. What appears
significant in connection with Arnheim’s novel, however, is the consistency of the
underlying impulse to explore the world aesthetically through an epistemology of
inversion forged in exile: cinema, following Arnheim’s theory, constructs an
image of the world according to laws of opposition and difference every bit as
strict as those that govern Eine verkehrte Welt. Arnheim describes these laws in an
introductory note to the novel’s manuscript, which describes the literary process
as a mechanical application: 
[F]or certain malicious reasons the author has thought it worth while
to describe an imaginative world in which peoples’ manners, public
institutions, private and social life are just the contrary of what they are
supposed to be in our own world. By transforming, in a more or less
mechanical and theoretical way, black into white, up into down, plus
into minus, and so on he came to a number of propositions which
seemed to possess a strange vital energy.34
In other words, and in keeping with an underlying impulse of science fiction as a
genre,35 the emphasis here is both on the aesthetic surplus value and on the knowl-
edge produced by turning things on their head. The “formula of inversion,” as
Arnheim calls it, “proved to be a spell able to conjure up odd dreams which look like
telling some queer sort of truth—as dreams often do—and in which the author felt
tempted to indulge. Thus, after having applied the key to the entrance, he confined
himself to describe what he saw and heard.” If the novel draws this queer sort of
truth—that is, its aesthetic value—from the inverse relationship of the narrator’s
home country and the strange customs abroad, then cinema draws its aesthetic quali-
ties from the distinctions between the spectator’s ingrained habits of perception and
their modification by the cinematic apparatus, between Weltbild and Filmbild.36
This, in any event, is the version of Arnheim’s film theory handed down
from the 1955 edition of Film as Art—a book that differs in profound ways from
Film als Kunst as originally published in 1932. As Eric Rentschler has detailed in a
careful rereading of the German original, the earlier version was considerably less
invested in the strict distinction between Weltbild and Filmbild, or between “world”
and “art.” This allowed for more excursions into the realm of the social than the
1955 version, which seems peculiarly cleaned up in this regard.37 We can only
speculate on the reasons for this reduction or, as Rentschler puts it, “repression.”
Rentschler himself wonders, with some justification, whether the pressures of the
McCarthy era on a Jewish emigrant from Germany with a leftist past might have
had something to do with it. For the structural isomorphism between the science-
fictional conceit and the world/art distinction in Film as Art is one that the novel
urges us to link to the experience of exile it self. The difference between
Arnheim’s novel and his aesthetic theory, then, would appear to lie in the valence
of (il)legibility: whereas in Eine verkehrte Welt the exiled protagonist is dumb-
founded, and semiosis fails as he is confronted with signs he does not know how to
read, the aesthetic argument of Film as Art holds, by contrast, that the very illegibil-
ity of the film image as image of the world—its difference from the routine,
mechanical reproduction of the world around us—is what grounds the semiotic
power of cinema. The emphasis on this difference, this illegibility, is exacerbated
under conditions of exile: this is the lesson of the novel—the structuring fantasy
of which is that of legibility restored—as much as of the 1955 edition of Film as
Art, where we find this fantasy sublimated in an aesthetic argument in favor of for-
mal estrangement. It is a lesson that Arnheim will underscore further in his 1963
review of Kracauer’s Theory of Film, to which I will return in conclusion.
***
Critics have tended to place Arnheim’s “formalist” approach—his insistence on
the power of aesthetic form, be it literary or cinematic, to estrange our perceptual
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Unterschieden zwischen Filmbild und Wirklichkeit zu danken” (we consequently owe the possibility of
making art with the film camera to those distinctions between the film image and reality), Film als
Kunst, p. 49.
37. Rentschler, “Rudolf Arnheim’s Early Passage.”
habits—in opposition to Siegfried Kracauer’s “realism” and its ontological assump-
tions. But if we turn from Kracauer’s summa, Theory of Film (1960), to the
lesser-known (but equally momentous) Ginster, we find in the latter a commitment to
modernist devices on par with Arnheim’s notions of aesthetic form.38 A look at
Kracauer’s novel, then—which Theodor Adorno, for one, considered “Kracauer’s
most significant achievement”39—will serve to relativize Kracauer’s realism and high-
light its formal contours in the realms of both literature and cinema. Beneath the
“redemption” that film is capable of offering reality, and contrary to Kracauer’s insis-
tence that his “material aesthetics” stand in opposit ion to previous formal
approaches,40 we can detect a profound commitment to aesthetic construction in his
work. As will become apparent to the reader of Ginster, that aesthetic construction
centers on a dialectical understanding of reification as both an alienating force to be
overcome and as a productive, unsettling cognitive effect, achieved through the
modernist device of estrangement, or what the Russian Formalists called ostranenie.41
Kracauer’s approach differs, to be sure, from that adopted in Eine verkehrte
Welt. Where the latter estranges us from our ingrained “world picture” through
inversion, Ginster performs this estrangement through an ingenious deployment
of narrative voice and an attendant unsettling of both the subjectivity and objec-
tivity of characters. The quasi-autobiographical plot follows a hapless protagonist
from the outbreak of war in 1914 through the end of World War I.42 From his stu-
dent days in Munich, he stumbles through a thankless job as an architect in
Frankfurt, into the military (where he mainly “peels potatoes against the enemy,”
204), and out again. He ends up in the provinces, where he waits out the conclu-
sion of the war in a corrupt municipal office, drafting architectural plans and an
accompanying book publication.43 Told in the third person, the narration is col-
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ored strongly by the protagonist’s moods, with his inner thoughts frequently
related as quasi-objective narration in free indirect discourse. This narrative
device, which blurs the boundaries between subjective and objective voice, effec-
tively enacts, at the level of aesthetic form, the quasi-anonymity that is both
announced and retracted by the book’s title, Ginster: Von ihm selbst geschrieben
(Ginster: Written by himself). Objectified through a name that is not the (anony-
mous) author’s—nor even really that of the protagonist (who, as we learn in the
first paragraph, “wasn’t really called Ginster”44)—the main character is nonethe-
less both writer and subject of the novel in which he appears in the third person. . 
Like Kracauer, moreover, our nameless hero has earned a Ph.D. but is plan-
ning to live without this title, “incognito, so to speak” (11). From here, the novel
will proceed to elaborate what it might mean for its protagonist to remain
unknown. On some level, this might be construed as simply wanting to blend in, if
not as the kind of “deliberate head-in-the-sand policy” that Adorno ascribed to
Kracauer himself in an underhanded tribute on his mentor’s 75th birthday.45 But
there is more to this “incognito.” As a fictional protagonist, Ginster makes for a
curiously reticent subject—one who says of himself that “after all, he was nothing”
(145), who “would have preferred not to become anything,” (24) and who repeat-
edly dreams of somehow vanishing from the scene altogether. In a conversation
with an older woman whom he admires, for example, Ginster blurts out, in spite
of himself (“aus einem ihm unerklärlichen Sprechzwang” [due to a compulsion to
talk, for which he had no explanation]), the difference that sets him apart: other
people, he notes, “are interested in their lives, they have goals, want to own and
achieve something. Every person I know is a fortress.” (132) If this sounds, among
other things, like a workable description of fictional protagonists—well-defined
characters with clearly articulated desires to motivate their actions—Ginster, by
contrast, is an antihero at best: “For my part, I want nothing. You probably can’t
understand this, but I’d rather trickle away.”46 Kracauer finds several formulations
for his protagonist’s impulse to vanish: on a purely physical level, he tries to avoid
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the draft by eating less and losing weight, but Ginster’s maxim to “hunger himself
away, just away” (181) betrays broader metaphysical—or at least metafictional—
implications; as does his desire to flee into a place beyond space (“gerne wäre
Ginster ins Raumlose geflüchtet”) (117), or to replace his bodily existence with a
different aggregate state altogether: “for his part, [Ginster] . . . would have liked to
be gaseous [gasförmig]” (140). To put this in the cinematic terms that hover just
below the surface of this text: Ginster dreams of the dissolve.
This evanescent subjectivity has its flip side in the obstinacy of objects and
the objectification of human beings: where either the fictional subject dissolves
along with the narrative categories of desire, motivation, and agency or the only
remaining desire is one for dissolution into gaseous matter without any spatial
extension, a reified world comes into view. As Gertrud Koch rightly observes, in
Ginster “only the material world of objects offers hooks for the eyes and for lan-
guage to find an anchor.”47
In a reversal characteristic of much of Kracauer’s writing, though, the cru-
cial object among objects turns out to be the human being—or rather the human
body. Ginster himself is a case in point: during a dance lesson, a break from the
spirit less instruction finds him “an orphaned instrument” (“ein verwaistes
Zweckinstrument” [28], leaning against a wall that had previously permitted oth-
ers to practice their steps. On a different day, after a morning at the office, he
“gradually dissolved, his contours began to run, and he was gone, in the wallpa-
per”48: the motif of reification joins that of the vanishing subject. Faces and bodies
become disfigured to the point that they transmute into objects: as a woman
speaks, her face assumes “the animation of a beautiful grotto formation” (30); the
narration turns people into their accoutrements when a “lorgnon fixates Ginster”
(31) and mother and aunt recede from view as “two hats, two coats. First straight
ahead and then right, down Main Street” (70).
The fragmentation and reification of individual human bodies is most
noticeable in descriptions of the military. Arms and legs become autonomous
objects, so many machine parts controlled by mechanical processes rather than
individual subjectivity. When the arm of Ginster’s friend Otto salutes passing offi-
cers, metonymically identified merely as uniforms, Ginster thinks to himself that
the military has 
forced him entirely into a rectangle . . . an automaton. With every other
uniform, the arm went up. It was not raised by Otto, but bolted up on
its own accord. Otto would not have recognized the uniforms. The arm
had to have been mounted with sprockets in his body. The system was
operated remotely by the uniforms. It could not be switched off and
presumably worked much better without Otto (50). 
What happens to Otto’s arms also transpires with Ginster’s legs. Once in the mili-
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tary, he works at developing automated salutations similar to Otto’s and partici-
pates in drills where the object is “to fling the legs in such a manner that they flew
over the entire barrack yard. Not that this would even have been all that bad,
quite the opposite. Ginster was pleased to be able to dismiss, if not himself, then a
few extremities at least.”49 The drill, like a later march of the troops to the coun-
tryside, turns into an extended Ballet mécanique, its emphasis on autonomous legs a
literary echo of the dancing mannequin parts in Léger’s 1924 film.
In 1931, three years after the publication of Ginster, Kracauer would review
the “failed experiment” that was Buster Keaton’s first sound film, Free and Easy,
contrasting it with the successful silent comedies. What had set the latter apart was
their medium-specific triumph over (literary) language: there is “hardly a literary
technique (Gestaltung),” Kracauer writes, “that could capture those modes of behav-
ior that silent film had already discovered and represented completely.”50 But how are
we to evaluate the apparent medium-specificity argument when Kracauer’s own liter-
ary technique approximates that of silent cinema? In a review of 1926, Kracauer had
described Chaplin’s screen persona as “a lacuna” (“ein Loch”): 
he has no will; in place of the drive to self-preservation and the hunger
for power, he exhibits nothing but emptiness, as blank as Alaska’s snow
fields. Others have a consciousness of themselves and enter into human
relationships; he has lost track of the Ego. . . . And since he owns no Ego:
how could he defend it against the great Ego-bundles? He shrinks from a
door if it opens behind him, for it, too, is an Ego; everything that takes
command, things dead and alive, everything has power over him, before
which one must draw one’s little hat, and thus he always draws his hat.51
For contemporary readers, this description of Chaplin resonated with Kracauer’s
evocation of Ginster: dating back to Joseph Roth’s glowing and influential review,
Ginster’s meanderings through the plot of the novel have been compared to
Chaplin’s stumbling characters in his films: “Ginster in war, that’s Chaplin in the
Department Store” was the tag line the publisher S. Fischer adopted from Roth to
market the book.52 Whether they stumble through literary or cinematic plots,
Ginster and Chaplin are both figures of alienation, medium-specificity notwith-
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standing. Kracauer’s own literary technique, in other words, did “capture those
modes of behavior that silent film had already discovered and represented com-
pletely,” and his film criticism and theory from the 1920s on valorized these
modes as part of his cultural poetics.53 For the film theorist Kracauer, the power of
estrangement that had animated the author of Ginster is coextensive with photog-
raphy and hence with the photographic medium of film. To make this point, he
returns more than once in his work to an extended quotation from Marcel
Proust’s A la recherche du temps perdu, where the narrator happens upon his grand-
mother and sees her through the eyes of “a photographer who has called to take a
photograph of places which one will never see again.” As Kracauer points out in
his reading of Proust, the latter compares the photographer here with three
types—the witness, the observer, the stranger—whose common trait is a certain
distance from the events they perceive; as a stranger, the photographer produces
a record that has the power to make strange the reality he records. As Kracauer
puts it in a well-known essay published while he was still working on Ginster, the
photographic archive “assembles in effigy the last elements of a nature alienated
from meaning.”54 Photography, he will write in Theory of Film, is “the product of
complete alienation.”55
If photography is partly a product of de-subjectivization, the photographic is
defined by what Kracauer calls its “affinity” for the object-world—including the rei-
fied human body. The cinema, in Kracauer’s realist theory, gravitates toward
inanimate objects, things normally unseen, the small and the big: a range of objects
that are, for Kracauer, “cinematic because they stubbornly escape our attention in
everyday life.”56 Betraying an extraordinary debt to Balázs, Kracauer celebrates the
cinema for its peculiar ability to zoom in on the physiognomy of things, or what he
calls their “psychophysical correspondences.”57 Film is distinguished by its power to
isolate fragments of the world, to defamiliarize them and thereby render visible their
position within the totality: “The motion-picture camera has a way of disintegrating
familiar objects and bringing to the fore . . . previously invisible interrelationships
between parts of them.”58
In this formulation of Kracauer’s film theory, then, we find the resonance of
his early novel with its recurring trope of the fragmentary, automatized body. And
it becomes apparent that the depiction of Ginster flinging his limbs this way and
that shares with photography, as theorized by Kracauer, precisely this tendency to
isolate, to abstract, and to reify parts of the human body—a tendency Kracauer
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also attributes, in turn, to the treatment of the actor as “an object among objects”
in the cinema.59
But just as in photography, according to Kracauer, there lies the promise of rec-
onciliation, there is also something redemptive to the reifying stance assumed by
Ginster’s narrative voice. In keeping with the faint but clearly articulated utopian
hope that Kracauer introduced in even his most relentless critiques of modernity
during the 1920s,60 Ginster operates on a double register. The mildly satirical tone in
which the sovereign ego is cut down to size and the world of objects claims its due
maps out a “verkehrte Welt,” perhaps; but it also intimates an order of things that
would no longer conspire against Ginster, tripping him up at every turn. 
This order of things—mapped in literature not only by Kracauer but also by
authors from Jaroslav Hasek, who created the influential figure of the Good Soldier
Svejk, to Franz Kafka, whom Kracauer greatly admired—is precisely the one offered,
according to Kracauer’s later Theory of Film, by cinema. Just as photography promises
a reconciliation between humans and nature, the alienating power of Kracauer’s
prose consists, as we have noted, in its ability to confront us with our own alien-
ation.61 But whereas the grandmother ultimately appears to Proust’s narrator
completely alienated, “hardly sane, a dejected old woman whom I did not know,”
Kracauer goes on to theorize the redeeming power of such an alienating gaze—its
ability to push through abstraction and alienation, to reconstitute an emphatic
notion of experience. Endowed with such a gaze, photography and film have the
power to “blast the prison of conventional reality” and open our eyes to what we over-
look in our everyday routines.62 Arresting though it may be, Kracauer notes, Proust’s
definition of photography as alienation is ultimately one-sided; it fails to encompass
precisely what the subtitle to Theory of Film calls “the redemption of physical reality.”
As Miriam Hansen suggests, “In the precarious temporality and historicity of photog-
raphy, its alienation from human intention and control, Kracauer traces a
countervailing potential, neither positivistic nor nostalgic, that he believes can be
actualized in the medium of film.”63 At stake in what Kracauer calls the “go-for-broke
game of photography” is nothing less than this idea of redemption, of reconciliation
between humanity and nature; the photographic media contribute to this idea
through their powers of reification—by fragmenting and integrating the sovereign
subject into the fabric of representation as an “object among objects” and by redeem-
Theory of the Novel 69
59. Kracauer, Theory of Film, p. 97.
60. See, for example, the essays “The Mass Ornament” and “Photography” in The Mass Ornament.
61. In an incisive essay on Kracauer’s enduring relevance as a theorist of the photographic, Lutz
Koepnick likewise emphasizes this aspect of his thought: “Kracauer’s writings on photography through-
out his entire career consider states of alienation as vital playgrounds of human experience, liquefying
the reified structures of the bourgeois subject and thus re-enabling the possibility of non-intentional
behavior and perception. . . . [Photography] alienates us from the mechanisms of alienation so as to
allow us to cling to the idea of a future reconciliation between humanity and nature, between the ratio-
nal and the material dimensions of the world” (p. 118). Lutz Koepnick, “In Kracauer’s Shadow: Physical
Reality and the Digital Afterlife of the Photographic Image,” in Culture in the Anteroom, pp. 111–27.
62. Kracauer, Theory of Film, p. 48.
63. Miriam Hansen, “Kracauer’s Photography Essay: Dot Matrix—General (An)Archive—Film,” in
Culture in the Anteroom, pp. 93–110.
ing the mute material world through the image of its transience. In a hymn to the
cinema of Jean Vigo, Kracauer celebrates the way “the camera does not discriminate
between human beings and objects, animate and inanimate nature.”64
To the reader of Ginster, however, the role of the photographer as a dis-
tanced observer and of cinema as a modernist medium of redemption will be
familiar as a literary device as well. What critics have described as Ginster’s “sub-
ject-less-ness” (“Ichlosigkeit”) and as the “photographic vision” of Kracauer’s
novel appears in this light as the narrative approximation of the photographer-
as-stranger in Proust—as a literary version of photography’s intentionless gaze,
one in which “what is living appears as atrophied, whereas the material world
becomes animated.”65 The narrative voice in Ginster functions as the literary ver-
sion of the photographic as Kracauer theorizes it in his writings from the late
1920s onward. 
A rereading of Ginster, however, also highlights a recurrent fantasy that
structures Kracauer’s theorizing. Formulated early in the novel as the protago-
nist’s desire to remain “incognito,” it is a fantasy of the vanishing subject, the
undoing of autonomous, individualized subjectivity, be it in the name of what
Adorno would ultimately philosophize as “the preponderance of the object” or
of some as yet unrealized—and certainly unnamed—utopia of collectivity.66 But
whereas in Ginster this subject wishes itself away, wanting to disappear unnoticed
from the scene, in Kracauer’s major works on film theory, written after the
Holocaust, the desire to fade away, let alone to transubstantiate into a “gaseous”
form, takes on a completely different valence. After the literal disappearance of,
among so many others, Kracauer’s mother and aunt at Theresienstadt, the
reduction of the subject to a thing-like entity and the fantasy of vanishing into
the décor can no longer function in the satiric register of Ginster. And yet, this
impetus returns forcefully in all those passages of Theory of Film that invoke the
power of cinema to make mute objects speak, to endow them with significance
and to subordinate to them the actor or individual as “an object among objects.”
Whereas Ginster still formulates this de-individuating fantasy from the stand-
point of the subject, Theory of Film will locate its relevance on the side of the
object-world and physical reality, which film—according to the book’s messianic
subtitle—has the power to redeem.67
Ginster treats the fantasy of becoming an object satirically; Theory of Film, on
the other hand, associates the realism of photographic media with melancholia as
a form of self-alienation: as Kracauer claims in an aside on “the possible role of
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melancholy in photographic vision,” 
melancholy as an inner disposition not only makes elegiac objects
seem attractive but carries still another, more important implica-
tion: it favors self-estrangement, which on its part entails identifica-
tion with all kinds of objects. The dejected individual is likely to lose
himself in the incidental configurations of his environment, absorb-
ing them with a disinterested intensity no longer determined by his
previous preferences.68
As if the exilic subjectivity of this “dejected individual” who has cast off his “previous
preferences” were not clear enough, Kracauer goes on to note the close relationship
between the melancholic’s “kind of receptivity” and the stranger’s, thereby referring
to a figure who will be central to his arguments about historiography as a profoundly
exilic craft in the posthumous History: The Last Things Before the Last. 
In the closing pages of Theory of Film, Kracauer both valorizes and tempers this
alienated form of “receptivity” by linking the concreteness of the film image and the
medium’s inherent realism with the question of experience. Thus he reintroduces a
humanist perspective into the “thicket of things” that litter the paths of Ginster and
the film spectator.69 We might say that the fantasy of the vanishing subject is both his-
toricized in relation to the experience of exile and at least partially reformulated by
reinstating the individual as the subject of experience at the end of Theory of Film. In
this sense, the late Kracauer edges towards the early Balázs, whom he still quotes in
the book, and the logic of whose fairy tales he invokes with an anecdote every bit as
Orientalist as the tales collected in The Cloak of Dreams: the movie spectator, Kracauer
claims, “drifts toward and into the objects—much like the legendary Chinese painter
who, longing for the peace of the landscape he had created, moved into it, walked
toward the faraway mountains suggested by his brush strokes, and disappeared in
them never to be seen again.”70
Such dissolution is anathema to Arnheim. Though he shares with Kracauer and
Balázs the tropes of exile, his underlying investment is not in a communion with the
other or physical reality but in their legibility. When Arnheim reviewed Kracauer’s
Theory of Film in 1963, he paid tribute to his fellow exile by calling it the “most intelli-
gent book ever written on the subject of film”—but then proceeded to critique the
melancholic stance that fueled the “most intelligent” enterprise. As if to evoke
Ginster’s desire to dissolve, evaporate, and lose his shape, Arnheim titled his review
“Melancholy Unshaped” and zeroed in precisely on Kracauer’s valorization of melan-
cholia, quoted above.71 Bemoaning the “surrender of the formative capacity of the
human mind to the raw material of experience,” Arnheim noted—both in culture at
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We seem to have returned to the dispute over formalism and realism, the
debate between an aesthetics that would redeem physical reality and a theory that
would insist on the importance of “interpret[ing] the raw material of experience
by means of significant form.” Against the background of these theorists’ literary
works, however, we may now recast this debate by considering these works’ struc-
turing fantasies—fantasies of wholeness, of inversion, and of subjectlessness, all
powerfully tied to tropes of exile and displacement. What emerges from a recon-
sideration of these theorists, then, is not merely the common project of elevating
the cinema to an art form, let alone of insisting on its specificity vis-à-vis other
media. It is also the shared impulse to track the alienating force of the moving
image, its power to place even the most essentialized notions of the “soul,” of the
Weltbild, and of “physical reality” at a critical distance. 
By emphasizing the links between the literary and the (film) theoretical, I
do not wish to reduce these authors’ fictional works to mere prolegomena for
their theories. With the possible exception of Eine verkehrte Welt, which is some-
what schematic in its “formula of inversion,” these are by no means “theoretical”
fictions. And no matter how Chaplinesque Kracauer’s hero may have appeared to
his readers, these are no “cinematic novels” either, if by that we mean the vaunted
“filmic writing” of the 1920s. Rather, as I hope to have shown, these rich literary
texts are part and parcel of a broader cultural poetics that their authors develop
throughout their entire work. Foregrounding the tropes of distancing, defamiliar-
ization, romantic projection, and inversion, these cultural poetics participate in a
larger modernist project inspired by, among others, Georg Lukács’s diagnosis of
“transcendental shelterlessness”—a trope playfully adopted by Kracauer and
Adorno in the 1920s, when they signed a letter to their mutual friend Leo
Löwenthal as “agents of the transcendentally shelterless.” Without hypostasizing
the biographical as a causal, explanatory reference for the literary and theoretical
explorations charted in the present essay, I do want to reiterate that for the three
classical film theorists discussed here, this notion of homelessness would play out
in the lived reality of exile. In a historicizing view, the centrality of dislocation and
alienation in their texts should come as no surprise, given the circumstances
under which they were developed. In this respect, careful attention to these film
theorists’ literary production yields new perspectives on the historical position
and the imaginative dimensions of classical film theory as a whole.
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